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Islam and democracy:  
debating electoral involvement on the Kenya coast 
In the Kenyan coastal town of Kilifi, an unobtrusive green sign is nailed to a telegraph pole in 
the market place. Painted on it, in neat white letters, are the words Demokrasi ni ukafiri: 
‘Democracy is unbelief’. It is a brief statement of one view in a complex debate amongst 
Muslims in Kenya, about the nature of their collective relationship with the secular state and 
its elected bodies. In the run-up to Kenya’s 2013 election, graffiti appeared across in the 
poorer parts of  Mombasa island, especially in the King’orani area: Kura  ni haramu, ‘voting is 
forbidden’, was a common message. A rash of posters appeared, plastered up next to, or over, 
the campaign posters of various candidates: Siasa ya vyama vingi ni siasa ya matumbo mengi, 
read one: ‘the politics of multi-partyism is the politics of many bellies’. More obliquely, a black 
banner draped above the entrance to the market on Mombasa’s main street read Quran ni 
suluhisho:’the Qur’an is the answer’, in itself an implicit critique of multi-partyism and 
secularism. 
This questioning of democracy was apparent in other forums, too. Sporadic ‘press releases’ on 
the web site of the East African branch of the  radical international Islamic movement Hizbut-
Tahrir, offered a vigorous denunciation of the ballot: ‘Democratic elections are intended to 
hijack the public ... elections are to legitimize oppression.... Do not plunge into democratic 
kufr.’1  Equally vivid in tone  was the discussion in some mosques at the coast, where speakers 
delivering lectures after Friday prayers used the occasion to urge worshippers to boycott the 
election, and argued that both the act of voting, and the practices of parliamentary democracy, 
were unIslamic. 
Those who offered this critique of democracy were echoing wider arguments which have been 
a powerful force on the coast in recent decades; in 2005, only around half of the Muslims 
surveyed in a poll at the Kenya coast were in favour of participation in ‘politics’.2 Yet in 2013 a 
great many Kenyan Muslims  evidently ignored the plea to make – as Hizbut-Tahrir put it – ‘a 
silent protest by citizens against multi-party democracy which was brought in Kenya in 1992 
by colonialists’.3 On the coast, more people voted than in any previous Kenyan election.4 In 
north-eastern Kenya, the other part of the country with a significant Muslim population, 
turnout was more patchy, but there was no evidence of a boycott. Focussing on the coast, this 
article discusses the debate amongst Kenyan Muslims over participation in the election, and 
what this reveals about the relationship between democracy and Islam in contemporary 
Kenya. Levels of electoral participation show that by no means all Muslims shun the ballot; but 
in contrast to some recent work we do not argue that this is the result of some inherent 
                                                          
1 ‘What should be done: change leaders or change the system?’,Shaaban Mwalimu, Hizbut-Tahrir East 
Africa, 27 Dec. 2012, http://www.hizb-
eastafrica.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=554:what-should-be-done-
change-leaders-or-the-system&catid=31&Itemid=128, viewed on 12 Nov, 2013. 
2 Hassan Mwakimako, Mosques in Kenya: Muslim Opinion on Religion, Politics and Development (Berlin: 
Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2007), p. 47. 
3 ‘The filth of democracy is beginning to be felt in Kenya!’,Shaaban Mwalimu, Hizbut-Tahrir, 27 Dec. 
2012. http://www.hizb-eastafrica.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=517:the-
filth-of-democracy-is-beginning-to-be-felt-in-kenya&catid=31&Itemid=128, viewed on 13 Nov. 2013. 
4 Justin Willis and Ngala Chome, ‘Marginalization and participation on the Kenya coast: the 2013 
elections’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 8, 1, (2014), pp. 115-34. 
‘moderation’ in Kenyan Islam which limits the influence of ‘radical elements’.5 Rather, we 
argue that there is a considerable gap between people’s professed ideas about the relationship 
between Islam and democracy and their actual practice. The failure of calls for a boycott might 
be seen as the flip-side of the failure of repeated efforts to mobilise a ‘Muslim vote’ in Kenya. 
Neither ‘exit’ nor ‘voice’ has become the dominant strategy, since Muslims have not formed a 
coherent political community. Many Kenyan Muslims are evidently comfortable with religious 
arguments which identify both majoritarianism and secularism as unacceptable, yet they 
participate in electoral politics. While this can be rationalized in religious terms as a necessary 
adjustment to circumstances in a Muslim-minority state, participation is more usually driven 
by Kenya’s politics of race, ethnicity and patronage.   
Islam, reform and democracy 
As John Esposito and John Voll noted in the 1990s, ‘democratization and Islamic resurgence 
have been complementary forces in many countries’.6 But the extent of this complementarity 
has been the subject of much scholarly argument, as well as popular debate, internationally– 
though the debate has tended to focus on Muslim-majority countries in the Arab world, Turkey 
and Iran. A number of non-Muslim observers have cast doubt on the apparent enthusiasm of 
Islamic reformers for elections, suggesting that this has been no more than a means to power: 
Martin Kramer has mocked the ‘academic apologists’ who argue that ‘Muslim fundamentalists’ 
can be agents of democracy, and Elie Kedourie’s sorrowful account of the failure of 
constitutional government in the Arab world is predicated on the assumption that ‘the idea of 
democracy is quite alien to the mind-set of Islam’.7 Others, however, have pointed out the 
diversity of Muslim scholarly opinion on democracy over the last century. While prominent 
scholars such as Sayyid Qutb insisted that since shari’a is complete law, no further legislation is 
possible and so there is no need for an elected legislature, others – like the leaders of the 
Nahda party in Tunisia in the 1980s – argued that people could make law, and that an elected 
legislature is entirely acceptable in Islam.8 This has led Ghassan Salame, for example,  to insist 
that ‘[s]omeone who is both a good Muslim and a good democrat is not an aberration’.9 
Esposito and Voll suggested both that the commitment of many Muslim religious leaders and 
politicians to democracy is sincere, and that an understanding of this commitment involves 
understanding that democracy was not simply a US or European ‘export’ to the world, but 
rather that Muslim reformers were themselves engaged in ‘defining Islamic democracy’.10This, 
they suggested, drew  on a series of principles fundamental to Islam: that of consultation 
(shura), consensus (ijma) and the exercise of informed, independent judgment (ijtihad).Other 
commentators have argued that some of the forms of this Islamic democracy – such as that 
                                                          
5
 Jeffrey Haynes, ‘Islam and democracy in East Africa’, Democratization, 2006, pp. 490-507; quote at p. 
501. 
6 John Esposito and John Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 
1996), p. 16. 
7 Martin Kramer, ‘Islam vs democracy’, in Martin Kramer, Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival 
(Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick and London, 1996), pp. 265-78; Elie Kedourie, Democracy and 
Arab Political Culture (Washington Institute: Washington, 1992), p. 1. 
8 John Esposito and James Piscatori, ‘Democratization and Islam’, Middle East Journal, 45 (1991), pp. 
427-40. 
9Ghassan Salame,’  Introduction’, p. 4,  in Ghassan Salame (ed.), Democracy Without Democrats? The 
Renewal of Politics in the Arab World (I B Tauris: London and New York, 1994, pp. 1-20. 
10Voll and Esposito,  Islam and Democracy, pp. 19, 21. 
advocated by Hassan al Turabi in Sudan - are really not democratic in any real sense.11 But in 
an earlier work with Jim Piscatori, Esposito had suggested that, whatever the reasoning of 
those involved, the  adoption of the language of democracy had anyway changed the nature of 
debate among Muslims: by the early 1990s, democracy had become ‘a powerful source of 
legitimacy....seen to be a universal good’.12 Piscatori returned to this theme in an extended 
historical discussion of international Muslim debates over democracy, suggesting that despite 
the hostility of Qutb or Sheikh Muhammad Mutawali al Sha’rawi, there has been a wider 
willingness to engage in elections as part of projects of Islamic reform. Even if this involvement 
was very instrumental,  the consequence was that the twentieth century saw the ‘infiltration 
into the hegemonic discourse of the vocabulary of participation’. Overall, Piscatori argued for 
the power of elections to ‘enmesh and entangle’ people into forms of thinking, as well as 
practice, which lead to ‘an internalisation of the underlying values’ of democracy.13 
This article shifts the focus to debates on Muslim participation in the rather different 
circumstances of a Muslim-minority state. It argues that the calls for withdrawal from politics, 
while vigorous, have been countered by an argument for an instrumental involvement in 
electoral politics, rationalized in terms of the need to defend the interests of the Muslim 
community. Sara Thordsen has argued – along the lines suggested by Piscatori – that in recent 
years ‘a new generation of Muslim leaders has  . . . been able to mobilize Kenyan Muslims’ and 
the consequence of this may be to increase ‘Muslim commitment to the rules of democratic 
government’.14  But this article also argues that the ‘united Muslim voice’ identified by 
Thordsen has in fact been elusive, and that electoral participation by Muslims has more to do 
with the politics of patronage than with any internalisation of the values of democracy.15 In a 
recent publication it has been argued that there is an ‘Islamic factor’ in Kenyan politics, a factor 
potentially offering a basis of unity for Muslims.16 Yet the politics of patronage nevertheless 
has had considerable influence and in various ways amongst Muslims in Kenya. 
Party politics and Islam on the Kenya coast, 1992-2010 
Over the last century, both ‘being coastal’ and ‘being Muslim’ in Kenya have come to be 
associated with being remote from wealth and power. Both categories are by no means 
identical, and each is in itself problematic. Yet both have been constantly used, often in 
overlapping ways, to make political arguments about what is now routinely called 
‘marginalization’, and how best to respond to it.  Soon after the British East Africa Protectorate 
was created at the end of the nineteenth century, the locus of political and economic power in 
the colonial state shifted from the coast – where there was a long-established Muslim 
community - to the highlands. In this new colonial state, Muslims were a minority from the 
outset, and the rapid spread of a Christianity which was closely linked to the colonial state, 
particularly in education, left Muslims increasingly remote from power and wealth; at 
                                                          
11 Hugh Goddard, ‘Islam and Democracy’, Political Quarterly (2002) 73, no. 1, pp. 3-9, at pp. 8-9.. 
12 Esposito and Piscatori, ‘Democratization and Islam’, p. 438. 
13 James Piscatori, Islam, Islamists and the Electoral Principle in the Middle East (Leiden: ISIM, 2000), 
pp. 22, 45-47. 
14 Sara Thordsen,  New Muslim Activism in Kenya (2009), pp. 3, 78; 
http://www.specialer.sam.au.dk/stat/2009/19990725/19990725.1.pdf 
15Thordsen, New Muslim Activism, p. 25. 
16 See Hassan Ndzovu, Muslims in Kenyan Politics: Political Involvement,  Marginalization, and  Minority  
Status (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 2014),68-105. 
independence, power and wealth passed into the hands of men who were largely Christian, 
and from ‘up-country’ Kenya. In consequence ‘mutual suspicion between Muslims and the 
state’ has been persistent.17 It is a mark of this suspicion that the results of the 2009 census – 
which showed that around 11% of Kenyans are Muslim – has been dismissed by some Muslim 
leaders who insist that the real figure is higher. 
 The coast itself has had an uncertain identity, in both religious and territorial terms. While it 
has often been seen as the heart of Kenya’s Muslim population, it has always had a large non-
Muslim population, and the number of Christians living in what was, administratively, ‘Coast 
Province’ grew steadily, significantly swelled over the last century by a steadily growing 
presence of migrants from other parts of the country.18  When the rest of the Protectorate 
became Kenya Colony in 1920, a ‘coastal strip’, nominally ten miles wide though actually never 
mapped, remained a protectorate, since it was formally part of the domains of the Sultan of 
Zanzibar. The coastal strip became the subject of  political debate in the early 1960s, as Kenya 
moved towards independence. Fear of domination by ‘up-country’ people inspired an 
unsuccessful movement for the strip to be reunited with Zanzibar, or to achieve a separate 
independence19. But a sense that ‘the coast’ has been excluded from power and wealth has 
been persistent since independence, despite chronic uncertainty over the central question of 
what ‘the coast’ means, both in terms of territory and identity.20 
From the mid-1960s to the early 1990s,  neither Islam nor the coast provided a basis for public 
political action in Kenya. The formal institutions of Islam in Kenya – notably the Supreme 
Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) - were very much ‘allies of the ruling regime’ in the 
single-party system under which Kenya had been governed since the 1960s.21 But from the 
early 1990s, the combination of the process of political liberalization in Kenya, and the wider 
Islamic ‘resurgence’ internationally, led to the increasingly common evocation of Islam in 
Kenyan politics.22 In early 1992, when President Daniel arap Moi gave in to increasing 
pressure to accept multi-party elections, the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) was formed; 
nominally a national organization, its strength lay very much at the coast.23 IPK soon came to 
                                                          
17 Kai Kresse, ‘Muslim politics in post-colonial Kenya: negotiating knowledge on the double periphery’, 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (2009), pp. 576-94, quote at p. 577; also Donal Cruise 
O’Brien, Symbolic Confrontations: Muslims Imagining the State in Africa (Hurst: London, 2003); Hassan 
Juma Ndzovu, ‘The politicization of Muslim organizations and the future of Islamic-oriented politics in 
Kenya’, Islamic Africa, 3, 1 (2012), pp. 25-53. 
18 David Sperling, ‘Religion and society’, in J. Hoorweg, Dick Foeken and R.A. Obudho (eds), The Kenya 
Coast Handbook. Culture, Resources and Development in the East African Littoral (Hamburg: LIT Verlag, 
2000), pp. 157-71 
19James Brennan, ‘Lowering the Sultan’s flag: sovereignty and decolonization in coastal Kenya’, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 50, 4 (2008), pp. 831-61. 
20 Thomas Wolf, ‘Contemporary politics’, in Jan Hoorweg, Dick Foeken and Ray Obudho (eds), Kenya 
Coast Handbook: Culture, Resources and Development in the East African Littoral (LIT Verlag: Hamburg, 
2000), pp. 129-55. 
21 Haynes, ‘Islam and democracy’, 493; Hassan Mwakimako, ‘Muslim NGOs and community 
development’ in Mohamed Bakari and Saad Yahya, Islam in Kenya: Proceedings of the National Seminar 
on Contemporary Islam in Kenya (Nairobi: MEWA, 1995), pp. 224-33. 
22Arye Oded, Islam and Politics in Kenya (Lynne Rienner, Boulder and London, 2000), p.8; Thordsen, 
New Muslim Activism, pp. 13-14, 41-44; Hassan Ndzovu, Muslims in Kenyan Politics, pp.79-105. 
23 Mohamed Bakari, ‘A place at the table: the political integration of Muslims in Kenya, 1963-2007’, 
Islamic Africa, 4, 1 (2013), pp. 15-48. 
be dominated by a Mombasa preacher, Khalid Balala.24 He formed a brief alliance with the 
national Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD).25 The alliance was not, however, an 
enduring one: FORD itself fragmented over rivalries between different aspiring leaders, and 
the  IPK was not allowed to register as a party.26 Its supporters kept up an intermittent 
campaign of demonstrations on the coast  in 1992-1993, but no parliamentary Muslim group 
emerged out of the 1992 elections, though IPK support apparently helped several FORD 
candidates to victory in Mombasa.27 The IPK was  weakened by Balala’s divisive style, and  was 
subject to continual official harassment and repression- the lack of registration aside, Balala 
himself was twice charged with serious criminal offences, and for a timebarred from Kenya on 
the grounds that he was not a Kenya citizen.28 Cruise O’Brien has argued that for at least some 
of those involved in IPK, this oppression may actually have been welcome – they had little 
interest in the complex politics of alliance building, and were more concerned to excite the 
sympathy of an external audience, in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.29 But the IPK’s failure can be 
explained in a more fundamental way: despite the optimistic belief of some Muslims in the 
1990s that ‘the conscientization of the Muslim masses’ was under way in Kenya,  the attempt 
to build a united Islamic political movement was undermined by deep divisions within Kenya’s 
Muslim community.30 
Kai Kresse has described Kenya’s Muslims as the inhabitants of a ‘double periphery’ – on the 
edges both of the Kenyan state and of the wider Islamic community.31 They have been subject 
to rival projects of proselytization since the 1970s. On the one hand, there has been a steady 
Shi’a influence from Iran; on the other, Saudi money has encouraged the work of self-conscious 
reformers who wish to make the practice of Sunni Islam more orthodox through banning bid’a 
‘innovations’, many of them associated with Sufi practices.32 This project of reform can be seen 
as conservative, in its insistence on a return to pure practices, and is sometimes described (by 
its proponents, as well as adversaries) as Salafist. But it can also appear as a socially 
progressive force, in its opposition to entrenched forms of privilege associated with those who 
claim an inherited status, and an ability to ‘bless’. The tensions introduced by these external 
influences became uncertainly overlaid on other chronic fault lines.33 There has been a degree 
of tension between coastal Muslims and ethnic Somalis – who are concentrated in the north-
east of the country, but have increasingly become a significant group on the southern coast, 
and in Nairobi, as their numbers have been swelled by refugees from Somalia itself; a majority 
of Kenya’s Muslims are now Somali, and they have increasingly contested the presumption to 
leadership of Muslims from the coast. 
                                                          
24Arye Oded, ‘Islamic extremism in Kenya: the rise and fall of Sheikh Khalid Balala’, Journal of Religion in 
Africa, 26 (4), 1996, pp. 406-15; Mwakimako, Mosques in Kenya, p. 51. 
25 Donal Cruise O’Brien, Symbolic Confrontations: Muslims Imagining the State in Africa (Hurst: London, 
2003), pp. 92-93. 
26 Mohamed Bakari, ‘Muslims and the politics of change in Kenya’, in Bakari and Yahya, Islam in Kenya: 
pp. 234-51,  at p. 246. 
27Oded. ‘Islamic extremism’, p. 411; also Islam and Politics in Kenya, pp. 149-62. 
28Bakari, ‘Muslims and the politics of change’, p. 246. 
29 Cruise O’Brien, Symbolic Confrontations, p. 97. 
30Bakari, ‘Muslims and the politics of change’, p. 247. 
31Kresse, ‘Muslim politics’, pp. 577-78. 
32Kresse, Muslim politics’, pp. 585-86. 
33Oded, Islam and Politics in Kenya, pp. 47-72, 112-21. 
But more significant in the early 1990s was a long-standing division which could be expressed 
in terms of ethnicity or social class, but came most often to be presented in the language of 
race. This has set Muslims who identified themselves as indigenous and African against those 
who – at least in the eyes of the first group – were alien, and often of Arab origin.34 Long a 
feature of Islam at the coast – as Janet McIntosh has shown – this tension has over time been 
exacerbated by the steady growth in the numbers of Muslims of ‘up-country’ origin.35 In the 
1990s,  IPK demonstrators were physically confronted by members of a group which called 
itself the United Muslims of Africa, which was widely believed to be supported by the 
incumbent regime. Rhetorically, the IPK and its supporters were denounced as outsiders, and 
accused of seeking to perpetuate their relative wealth and status by appropriating Islam as 
their possession, and excluding others from positions of leadership.36 
These perceived racial divisions do not coincide neatly, or even at all, with debates over 
reformism. Some see Salafism as a means to assert the equality of all Muslims, and so to 
challenge the presumptions of high-status Arabs whose religious practices have become 
corrupt; others see it as a campaign to reform the wayward practices of African Muslims. Some 
Sufis see themselves as African Muslims whose religious practice is under attack from Arabs; 
some believe they are protecting traditional prerogatives against pushful recent converts to 
Islam from up-country.  And as Thordsen has argued the straightforward identification of 
Salafism with political Islamism and violence, which has become embedded as a fundamental 
assumption of counter-terrorism literature, can be problematic; a doctrinal concern to 
suppress bid’a is not always synonymous with political radicalism.37 These multiple, cross-
cutting divisions have meant that, while the influx of Somali refugees has increased the size 
and the economic importance of Kenya’s Muslim population,   the Muslim community - so often 
evoked in rhetoric - has remained entirely elusive in terms of political action.  
After the demise of the IPK, divisions continued to be apparent. The long debate over Kenya’s 
constitution - which for a time seemed to threaten the position of the Kadhi courts which have 
since the colonial period offered a means for Muslim to seek justice in relation to domestic 
cases – provided a focus for political action, and inspired explicit arguments for electoral 
participation. Sheikh Ali Shee – a Salafist, in doctrinal terms – published an extended statement 
insisting that democracy is entirely Islamic, so long as it operates within the constraints set by 
the shari’a and by a recognition of divine, rather than human sovereignty; like many others, he 
looked to the popular approval of the caliph Abu Bakr as an analogue for elections.38 Perhaps 
even more importantly, however, he argued that even participation in corrupted, non-Islamic, 
forms of democracy is not only  acceptable, but is in the interests of the community in Muslim-
minority states, since it can give political power to Muslims; and he mocked Hizbut-Tahrir as a 
‘little group’, whose calls for a caliphate were based on ignorance.39 The logic of his argument 
required Muslim unity; that alone would give political power to the community. 
                                                          
34Thordsen, New Muslim Activism, . p. 11; Ndzovu, ‘The politicization of Muslim organizations’, pp. 30-
31, 34; Oded, Islam and Politics in Kenya, pp. 60-66. 
35 Janet McIntosh, The Edge of Islam. Power, Personhood and Ethnoreligious Boundaries on the Kenya 
Coast (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009) 
36Oded, ‘Islamic extremism’, p. 412; Cruise O’Brien, Symbolic Confrontations, pp. 92-93. 
37Thordsen, New Muslim Activism, pp. 16-18 
38 Ali Mohammed Shee, Siasa na Islam (Mombasa, 2007). 
39 Ali Shee, Siasa na Islam, p. 58-60. 
But while Thordsen has argued that a ‘new Muslim consensus’ was generated in this period, 
the proliferation of occasionally rivalrous Muslim leadership organizations suggests 
otherwise.40 Some (the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK); the Kenya Muslim 
National Advisory Council (KEMNAC); the National Muslim Leaders Forum (NAMLEF)) have 
claimed to provide advocacy for the community; others (the Muslim Consultative Council, the 
Majlis al Ulama) presented themselves as bodies intended to provide scholarly advice and 
guidance. In practice, scholarly and political roles could blur; none achieved widespread 
acceptance, and all remained in an uneasy relationship with SUPKEM, which struggled to shed 
the reputation of being dominated by Arabs from the coast.41 All advocated political 
engagement in constitution-making , but they agreed on little else; so for example, while some 
Muslim organizations called vigorously for a ‘no’ vote in the 2005 constitutional referendum, 
because they saw it as a threat to the place of the kadhi courts,  others refused to do so.42 
The lack of consensus could be doctrinal or intellectual in basis: as in the debate between those 
who abhorred secularism and sought an ‘ecumenical’ constitution, and those who saw a 
secular constitution as the only means to protect Muslims from Christian domination.43 But 
more often it was the result of personal or ethnic rivalries, which could be pursued through 
manoeuvring for recognition by (and  consequent financial and political support from) 
national politicians. Kenya’s politics revolves around patronage and individuals’ ability to act 
as interlocutors with government – delivering the support of ‘their’ community to the 
government in return for the ability to plead their case, and to channel resources to them. 
While Muslim leaders claimed – and aspired - to speak for a community of all Muslims, in fact 
they were always positioning themselves as the patrons of fractions of a community which was 
multiply divided on racial and ethnic lines. In the 2007 elections – at a time when proposed 
anti-terrorism legislation had revived for many Muslims the fear of persecution at the hands of 
a hostile state – one of these organizations, NAMLEF, endorsed the candidacy of Raila Odinga, 
one of the two main contenders in the presidential race.44 They signed a memorandum of 
understanding – an ‘MoU’ - with Raila as the condition of this support. Unwisely, this was kept 
confidential, and as a result a fake copy of the ‘MoU’ appeared on the internet (its spread 
encouraged by individuals in the US who sought to encourage the idea that Barack Obama was 
somehow implicated in support for Raila and for radical Islam).45 Wild rumours circulated, 
with Raila being accused of ‘Islamism’. 
The truth was less dramatic, but more revealing of the politics of Islam in Kenya. What is 
widely believed to the real text of the agreement (now available on Wikileaks) committed 
Raila to work for a ‘radical transformation of Kenya to be a just, harmonious, peaceful and 
prosperous nation’ and to end discrimination against Muslims: commitments which Raila was 
                                                          
40Thordsen, New Muslim Activism, p. 47 
41Bakari, ‘A place at the table’, p. 34. 
42Abdulkadir Hashim, ‘Searching for religious authority: Muslims and religious leadership in Kenya’, 
Annual Review of Islam in South Africa, 8 (2005), 
http://www.cci.uct.ac.za/usr/cci/publications/aria/download_issues/2005/2005_hashim.pdf ; cf ‘Raila 
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43Abdelkader Tayob, ‘Kadhi’s courts in Kenya’s constitutional review (1998-2010): a changing approach 
to politics and state among Kenyan Muslim leaders’, Islamic Africa, 4, 1 (2013), p. 103-24. 
44 Jan Bachmann and Jana Honke, ‘”Peace and security” as counterterrorism? The political effects of 
liberal intervention in Kenya’, African Affairs, 109, 434 (2009), pp. 97-114. 
45For one example, see https://archive.org/details/BarackObamasCousinRailaOdinga-
AgreementForIslamicShariaLaw  viewed 4 Jan. 2014. 
very willing to make publicly.46 The more controversial aspect of the ‘MoU’  was that Raila also 
agreed to make NAMLEF, his ‘partner of choice’ in seeking Muslim support (the use of this kind 
of commercial/business language is itself striking). That aspect of the MoU suggested very 
strongly that it was part of a deliberate campaign to displace SUPKEM; presumably it was this 
aspect which was supposed to be confidential. Meanwhile, Raila’s opponent, Mwai Kibaki, 
attracted the support of Ahmed Msellem, a senior Salafist sheikh who many would consider to 
be an Arab, who denounced the deal with NAMLEF. Kibaki also received the support of Juma 
Ngao, a vocal preacher from Mombasa and the key figure in KEMNAC, who was an advocate of 
the rights of African Muslims and an implacable critic of ‘Arab’ dominance – whose dislike of 
the MoU with Raila may have reflected his rivalry with the CIPK, which was at this point 
formally a ‘member’ of NAMLEF and supported the MoU. In the event, there seems to have 
been no ‘Muslim vote’ in 2007 – though many Muslims voted. The long-term consequence of 
the MoU was, if anything, to encourage scepticism over Raila’s reliability – as there was 
uncertainty over exactly what had been agreed, there were many suggestions that Raila had 
failed to deliver on his side of the deal, and was not committed to supporting Muslim 
interests.47 
A dispute over the results of the 2007 election led to an outbreak of violence (in which 
Muslims were only marginally involved)and to a negotiated outcome, in which Raila became 
prime minister in return for accepting Kibaki’s presidency.  As prime minister, Raila made a 
gesture towards the terms of the MoU by nominating  Shaykh Muhammad Dor to parliament. A 
scholar, and imam at a prominent mosque in Mombasa, Dor was also a leader of CIPK. The 
nomination  signalled  CIPK’s willingness to be involved in politics, and evidenced their 
effective use of their religious authority to assert their claim to represent the Muslim 
community 
The settlement between the Kibaki and Raila included agreement on the urgent need for a new 
constitution, and in 2010 an agreed draft of this was put to a popular referendum. In contrast 
to the situation in 2005, when Muslim opinion had been divided, there was remarkable 
unanimity in the 2010 referendum. Muslims were encouraged to vote for the proposed 
constitution by all prominent Muslim leaders. Although the preamble acknowledged ‘the 
supremacy of Almighty God of all creation’, the constitution was a secular one, stating that ‘all 
sovereign power belongs to the people of Kenya’.Given this, the declaration by leaders of both 
NAMLEF and SUPKEM that ‘It is a big YES for Muslims’ was perhaps a surprising endorsement. 
48 The Friday Bulletin, the weekly publication by the Nairobi Jami’a Mosque, which is widely 
read by Muslims, ran a headline directly urging its readers to ‘Go out and register’. Bemoaning 
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the low levels of registration in Muslim areas,  the Bulletin reminded readers that the 
referendum was ‘of paramount importance for the country’s future’.49 
The enthusiasm for the 2010 constitution was driven partly by the Kadhi courts issue: the new 
proposed constitution gave them formal recognition, which infuriated many Christian clerics: 
the endorsement of the draft by Muslim leaders was a reaction to this ‘onslaught on the 
Kadhis’ courts’.50 The Bulletin carried the advice of one Muslim scholar that ‘although the 
constitution was generally not in conformity with the Islamic Sharia, which is the ultimate law 
for every Muslim . . . the draft had some good elements that were beneficial to the ummah.’51 A 
Friday lecture at the Nairobi Jami’a Mosque elaborated on this theme: ‘Muslim participation in 
the political process is a dharura (necessity). It is a case of the maslaha (benefits) overriding 
the mafsada (harm). Nobody is saying that we leave the hukm of Allah and take other 
legislations. Our participation aims at safeguarding the interests of Muslims’.52 The slightly 
equivocal nature of this endorsement – and the extent of debate amongst Muslims -  is 
underlined by a lengthy statement carried by the Bulletin only a few months earlier, which 
effectively condemned democracy in the course of an extended critique of the behaviour of 
contemporary Muslims ‘Do you encourage democracy and ridicule the call for the Shari’ah? Do 
you encourage, support and assist the kufaar...?’ The same piece offered a striking list of 
contemporary ills: ‘We must recognize evils such as prostitution, alcohol, drugs, racism, 
democracy, nationalism and secularism in order that we may shun them’.53 
A more prosaic motive may also have underlain this unanimity. In contrast to the situation in 
2005, the major figures in Kenya’s national politics were almost united in supporting (or at 
least, not opposing) the new constitution; Kibaki and Raila both campaigned for it. Only 
William Ruto, a Rift Valley politician, openly campaigned against the constitution, and he did so 
through an unequivocal assertion of his support for the Christian churches’ position. No 
Muslim leader could join that campaign; and all Kenya’s other political patrons were in the 
‘yes’ camp; the logic of patronage politics, as well as support for Kadhi’s courts, drove Muslim 
support. The proposed constitution was approved by around 68% of voters.54 
Debating democracy: Muslims in Kenya under the new constitution 
‘Islam’, and Esposito and Piscatori noted, ‘lends itself to variable interpretations’, and this is 
certainly evidenced by the continuing debates amongst Kenyan Muslims over democracy and 
elections since 2010.55 In 2012-13, those who called for an election boycott were a visible and 
sometimes very audible minority. More widely, however, those individuals and organizations 
who claimed to represent Kenyan Muslims argued for involvement in the elections, and evoked 
the idea of a united Muslim community using the ballot to advance its interests. Yet they were 
quite unable to agree on which politicians to support, or what a Muslim political agenda might 
be. In the end, they provided a rather ambivalent endorsement of the process, which 
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authorized voting by Muslims to protect the interests of the community – yet failed to create a 
‘Muslim vote’. 
On the coast, the call for an election boycott in 2013 did not come solely from Muslims.  Stirred 
by the constitutional debates of 2005-10, the idea of coastal secession - dormant but not 
extinct since 1963 – suddenly became active again. Associated with a group which came to call 
itself  the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), the idea  gathered a brief momentum in the run 
up to the 2013 elections. There was substantial public sympathy at the coast for some of the 
grievances expressed by the secessionists, though there was little evidence of any general 
enthusiasm for the idea of secession (the profound practical challenges of which were not 
discussed by the campaigners). The MRC’s leaders called for a boycott of the election; and 
while the MRC was not a Muslim movement in terms of its goals or rhetoric, the fact that its 
most prominent leaders were Muslims may have encouraged a degree of blurring in the 
motivations of those who spray-painted urban walls with the call to boycott. The litany of 
coastal marginalization – educational disadvantage, loss of land, poor employment 
opportunities – was very similar to that recited by Muslims.56 Radical Islamists, particularly 
those associated with the distinctive politics of al Shabaab,   have evidently sought to play on 
coastal disaffection in mobilising violence.57 But the suggestion that the MRC – in itself a rather 
uncertain phenomenon, organizationally - has been institutionally linked either to al-Shabaab 
or to Islamic radicalism internationally seems implausible.58 The language with which Hizbut-
Tahrir, for example, called for boycott asserted involvement in an international community of 
Islam, which should be governed by sharia: they did not argue for coastal particularism.  
Theologically, the radical proponents of boycott followed Qutb in deploring the implication 
that a human legislature might be needed. God’s law, they argued is already complete. 
‘According to secular thought, human legislated laws are superior ... It is quite clear that 
carrying such a thought or to be carried away by its decisions is against Islam’.59 The notion of 
‘popular sovereignty’ was seen as similarly anathematic: ‘Democratic politics are based on the 
Kufr Aqeedah of secularism, ie separating religion from life by giving human beings the 
sovereignty to legitimize and prohibit’.60 And politically, the radical Islamic call for boycott 
linked elections directly to the power of ‘Western nations’. ‘Democracy and its evil capitalist 
ideology’, in this view, have been central to the systematic oppression not only of Islam but of 
poor people across the world generally. ‘Under the pretext of  Democracy, great Western 
nations through their puppets perpetrate genocide in Africa, Middle East and Asia’.61 Elections, 
capitalism and colonialism are all bundled up in this argument, which by contrast offers Islam 
as the root to liberation from oppression:  
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These politics are a colonial tool used by the West ... Western countries compete in 
getting their political puppets from these countries and sponsor them so as to win 
elections and later on form their governments that help achieve their colonial 
objectives.62 
The Khutba during Friday prayers are commonly used to remind Muslims of their membership 
of an international Muslim community, and to argue that this community is constantly 
threatened by hostile forces. Where those giving the Friday sermon in mosques  chose to speak 
against voting – as some did -  they did not mention coastal secession. Their argument was 
rather that democracy questions God’s sovereignty, that it implies approval for a corrupt 
political system, and that it risks placing man-made laws above the divinely-provided guidance 
of the Qu’ran.63 Yet even the wasiya(wise counsel) against democracy was not preached in all 
mosques; generally, it was confined to those associated or coming under the influence of the 
Hizbut-Tahrir’s demands for the reinstitution of the caliphate. 
The calls for boycott were, anyway, largely drowned out by calls for involvement: in mosques, 
on the main Muslim radio stations, and on the internet. Sometimes, the approval given in 
mosques was tacit: coming in the form of reminders to register as voters, made in 
announcements after the sermon or posted up on noticeboards. But in other cases speakers 
chose to work the call to vote into the sermon itself: assuring worshippers that voting was not 
haram, and in some cases telling them that they had a duty to vote.64 The predominance of this 
pro-voting message reflected he position taken by the multiple, rival, organizations of formal 
Muslim leadership. All of these, throughout Kenya, encouraged participation in the elections, 
and they echoed the emphasis on peace that characterized almost all election support 
activities. 
Their stance was in part a consequence of the flow of US and European donor money into 
Muslim organizations in Kenya over the last decade. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the 
counter-terrorism strategies of the US and its allies were criticized for their clumsiness and 
‘military bias’65. But – while the US and others have continued to provide funds for ‘hard’ 
security - these programmes quickly developed an element of ‘soft security’, which combined 
physical development work – the building of schools and clinics – with an engagement with 
civil society.66 The idea that ‘radicalization’ was the result of poverty and injustice was key to 
this; if people’s material circumstances  and their experience of government could be 
improved, they would be much less likely to support violence against the US and its allies.  
The effectiveness of building schools as a route to winning ‘hearts and minds’ has been 
questioned; on the whole, local communities have been relatively unimpressed by these 
                                                          
62 ‘Who is better in judgment than Allah?’,Shaaban Mwalimu. 
63
 For example sermons delivered Masjid Arqam, Likoni, 16 Nov. 2012; Masjid al Rahma, Kisauni, 14 Dec. 
2012; Masjid Siddiq, 23 Nov. 2012. 
64 For example, sermons delivered in Masjid Taqwa, Changamwe, 23 Nov. 2012; Masjid Riyadha, Likoni, 
23 Nov. 2012; Masjid bin Hemed, 30 Nov. 2012. 
65 Peter Kagwanja, ‘Counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa: new security frontiers, old strategies’, Africa 
Security Review, 15, 3 (2006), pp. 72-86. 
66 Jeremy Lind and Jude Howell, Aid, Civil Society and the State in Kenya since 9/11 (London: LSE, 
2008); Bochmann and Honke, ‘”Peace and security”. 
gestures.67 But the rather more limited funds put into working with and through Muslim civil 
society organizations – such as CIPK, or  Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) may have had 
more effect. Although Lind and Howell have emphasised the extent of the mutual suspicion 
between donors and Muslim organizations, it does seem that ‘antiradicalization’ programmes, 
notably those funded by the Danish and UK governments, have had an effect.68 They have 
evidently encouraged the use of an internationalized (English) language of liberalism, good 
governance and democracy (as well as the metaphors of business) among a significant cohort 
of educated Muslims who work for these programmes.69  In 2014, visitors to the(apparently 
inactive)  blog page of CIPK might have been surprised to discover that there was no mention 
of Islam in its statement of values, and that the organization’s ‘Vision’ was described as ‘A 
society that enjoys fulfilled lives, harmoniously co-exist [sic] by upholding respect for human 
dignity and the diversity of culture and religion’.70 It would, however, be too crude to say that 
these organizations have simply been paid to develop an enthusiasm for elections, as part of a 
suite of liberal attitudes associated with the donors who fund them. There has been a degree of 
convergence of interest here; these Muslim civil society organizations see themselves as 
pursuing the advancement of collective Muslim interests, and see that aim as entirely 
compatible with – indeed, indistinguishable from - the promotion of their own particular 
organizations, and the status and income which they derive from those organizations Whether 
that leads to a wider ‘internalisation of the underlying values’ of democracy suggested by 
Piscatori is less certain.  
The Friday Bulletin– published and largely written in Nairobi, and itself involved in the chronic 
struggle over who should be the ‘voice’ of  Kenya’s Muslims -  is itself evidence of an  
engagement with non-Muslim scrutiny. Written in English, with helpful translations of some 
key terms, it seems aimed at least partly at an external audience. Throughout the run-up to the 
election, it carried stories and editorials urging the need for Muslim involvement; the last of 
these offered a slightly obscurely worded but definite statement in support of elections: 
As to the question of whether elections constitute the only means of achieving 
participatory governance, many agree that elections define the concept of citizenship 
and are therefore an acceptable apparatus for the realization of human dignity and the 
implementation of the rule of law71 
The Friday Bulletin combined these with several articles offering religious arguments for 
voting, which themselves were drawn from a range of international sources – suggesting both 
the vigour of the debate on this issue, and the extent to which it is, very consciously, an 
international debate amongst Muslims. The most expansive justification for electoral 
participation published by the Bulletin came from Wael Shihab, of the International Union for 
Muslim Scholars, who cited the Qu’ran (Surat al Nisa, 58) to argue that ‘Voting in elections, as 
far as Islam is concerned, is a form of testimony that a Muslim should honestly and faithfully 
bear’. Also offering the example of Yusuf’s decision to serve Pharaoh, which brought benefit to 
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all, Shihab suggested that ‘It is a duty for all Muslims to vote for the most capable and eligible 
candidates’; and he blurred the nature of the community whose interests should be 
considered, referring both to the ‘community’ (implicitly, Muslims) and to ‘the country’.72 In 
not dissimilar vein, Sheikh Taha Jabir of the Muslim World League was quoted saying that 
political participation ‘afford us the opportunity to protect our human rights, guarantee the 
fulfilment of our needs, and work for the improvement of living conditions for Muslims and 
non-Muslims … whatever helps us to achieve these noble goals becomes Islamically 
obligatory’.73 
But the general argument made in these articles was more equivocal, and largely rested on a 
doctrine of necessity. While ‘the concept of democracy as it was being practised was anathema 
to Islam’, Muslims ‘living in countries where they are a minority’ should participate in 
elections,  in order to prevent discrimination against Muslims and secure the best conditions 
possible for fellow-believers.74Sheikh Muhammad Salim al Munajjid, of the Islamic QA website, 
was cited supporting this view: ‘Noone should imagine that anyone who says that it is OK to 
vote is thereby expressing approval or support for kufr (unbelief). It is done in the interests of 
Muslims, not out of love for kufr and its people.’75 Sh. Haitham al Hadad argued that 
‘establishing a democratic system’ would be an act of unbelief, but for Muslims to vote within 
an established system, where they were a minority, did not imply approval or acceptance of 
the system – it was simply a means to fulfil the cardinal Muslim duty of preventing evil and 
attaining good.76 Sh. Abdur Raheem Green, of the London Central Mosque was cited offering an 
opinion even more blunt on this: ‘I have no doubt that democracy is anti-ethical [sic] to Islam’, 
but Muslims should ‘use the means and avenues available to benefit the Muslims’.77The logic of 
this was taken further by some: voting might well be a choice between two evils, but the duty 
of Muslims was to choose the lesser evil, and vote for the candidate who would do least harm 
to the community.78 
In arguing that the needs of the Muslim community demanded that people participate, all these 
arguments – whether locally made, or simply echoed versions of wider debates – were 
inextricably combined with calls for  Muslim unity, and the implication that leaders could 
guide a united community: Abdillahi Abdi of NAMLEF was reported to have said that ‘Muslim 
leaders have an obligation to provide guidance to the community to ensure that they elected 
suitable candidates.’79 The implication was that Muslims leaders could then negotiate with 
politicians on behalf of all Muslims, collectively, as some had tried to do in 2007: ‘Muslims are 
better off remaining a block and voting from a united front’.80 Muslims could and should vote – 
but only in order to create the Muslim vote. 
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The problem was, however, that Muslim unity remained as elusive as ever. The brief consensus 
of 2010 had soon vanished, although the feeling persisted amongst many Muslims that they 
were marginalized by the state – a feeling exacerbated by the state’s  heavy-handed response 
to increasingly frequent acts of terrorism by Muslim radicals linked to al-Shabaab.81 Although 
Muslim leaders protested against the harassment of the community, the rival organizations 
which claimed to represent Muslims could not reach any agreement on which candidate or 
party to support, in any of the multiple ballots (the election involved choosing six separate 
levels of representation).82 When NAMLEF sought to call a conference to agree on advice to 
Muslim voters, it was criticized for trying to speak for all Muslims; a later attempt to  endorse 
the CORD coalition of Raila Odinga was again denounced by others.83 Divisions within 
organizations became apparent: a deputy chair of SUPKEM expressed support for Raila, but 
received no institutional support from SUPKEM as a whole, and when some of the office-
holders of CIPK declared their preference for Uhuru Kenyatta’s Jubilee coalition, they were 
swiftly denounced by their fellows – and by other organizations.84 JumaNgao, the leader of 
KEMNAC, declared his support for Uhuru Kenyatta – reportedly claiming to speak for ‘coastal’ 
people, rather than Muslims - and explained his decision as a precautionary move to ensure 
that coastal people would be represented in the event of an Uhuru victory.85 Those who 
declared their support for Raila largely justified this in terms of collective Muslim interest – 
arguing that Raila’s commitment to the new constitution would help Muslims as a group.86 
Allegations circulated that the support of some of these individuals had been bought with 
money, or the promise of position; some publicly accused others of being ‘self-seekers [who] 
do not represent Muslims’.87When Mohamed Abduba Dida, a Muslim,  put himself forward as a 
candidate for the presidency, late in the campaign, he was not a unifying factor. While many 
enjoyed his performance in the televised debate between candidates – in which he gleefully 
played the role of the political outsider – this did not translate into significant support, and no 
Muslim organization chose to endorse his candidacy. 
This disunity effectively invalidated  one of the key arguments for electoral participation – 
since there was no ‘Muslim vote’ which could be used to argue for the collective interests of the 
community. But that argument continued to be used right up to election day, and the Friday 
Bulletin – and those leaders who did not declare their support for any candidate – fell back on 
urging Muslims to avoid becoming divided by their political differences.88. 
Popular participation: the power of patronage 
Determining levels of Muslim participation in elections rests largely on inference from general 
statistics, combined with some very limited opinion poll work. In combination, these suggest 
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that overall, Muslims are less likely to participate in elections than are other Kenyans, but that 
this is far from taking the form of a general boycott. Voting figures show that parts of Kenya 
with large Muslim populations saw relatively low participation rates: the table below shows 
registration and turnout (presidential ballot) rates for the ten counties which have significant 
(though not necessarily majority) Muslim populations.  
County % of estimated 
eligible population 
registered as voters 
% turnout from 
registered voters 
Turnout expressed as 
% of estimated 
eligible population  
Mombasa 93.3 66.6 62 
Kwale 57.6 72 41.5 
Kilifi 65 65 42 
Tana River 71 81 58 
Lamu 110.6 84 93 
Garissa 40 80 32 
Wajir 26.3 85 22 
Mandera 25.3 84 21 
Marsabit 76.9 86 66 
Isiolo 78.8 87 69.5 
NATIONAL AVERAGE 79.7 86 68.5 
 
Table 1: registration, turnout and participation rates, derived from Independent Electoral and 
Boundaries Commission reports on registration and election results, available at www.iebc.or.ke 
Registration and turnout rates were very low in some areas – notably in north-eastern 
counties with majority Somali Kenyan populations (Wajir, Mandera, and Garissa), where 
participation rates were very much below the national average. On the other hand, registration 
and turnout rates in four coastal counties (Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi, Tana River) and in Marsabit 
and Isiolo, are markedly  higher, though  below the national average. The figures for Lamu – 
including the apparently impossible registration figure, which suggests that number of eligible 
voters was underestimated – were very high. This reflects the particular circumstances in that 
county, where there was a very open political tension between a  (largely Muslim) population 
which regards itself as indigenous and a community of recent migrants from elsewhere in 
Kenya, who are largely Christian. The implication of these voting statistics is supported by 
three opinion polls, which have shown that Muslim respondents are consistently less likely to 
say that they voted than are Kenyans as a whole.89  In combination with the geographical 
statistics, however, the figures might also be seen to indicate a specific sense of alienation 
amongst Somali Kenyans, especially those in the north-east. The north-east saw its own 
secessionist struggle in the 1960s – much longer, more violent and bitter than that at the coast, 
and with much wider popular support. This was brutally suppressed; and the north-east has 
remained an uncertain, frontier area, poorly integrated with the rest of Kenya.90 Events since 
the early 1990s have confirmed the marginality of the north-east, and of Kenya’s Somali 
population more widely, which has been swelled by large numbers of refugees; the 
ramifications of the conflict in Somalia itself have exacerbated tensions within that population, 
and between Somalis and the Kenyan state, leading  to security operations against Somalis in 
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Kenya which involve considerable levels of violence.91The Kenyan military incursion into 
Somalia in 2011 has been followed by an escalation of terrorism in Kenya itself, and more 
brutal security operations. 
How far the  earnest arguments expounded in the Friday Bulletin encouraged participation 
among Muslims, at the coast - or elsewhere in Kenya - is difficult to say. The logic of expediency 
was certainly widely understood: as one imam at the coast said ‘if you separate yourself from 
politics, then decisions will be made which you do not like.’92 The leader of KEMNAC set out 
this argument with a practised fluency when interviewed – emphasizing the importance of 
voting, and the traditional Islamic precedents for this. But he also denounced the majoritarian 
and secular implications of democracy: 
Even when the Prophet was alive (PBUH) people voted … [and] When Abu Bakr Sidiq 
was chosen, people voted for him by raising their hands… In my view, voting itself is 
not haram, nor it haram to vote for someone who has done no harm to the believers in 
this country. 
..But democracy, modern democracy, is haram…. You know, democracy means – the 
majority get what they want. But Islam is not concerned with democracy. Islam is 
concerned with justice… in Egypt, under the rule of Pharaoh, Pharaoh was accepted as 
their king and their God. And his cabinet of ministers, and the people, regarded him as 
God. But he wasn’t God. Only Moses, and his brother Harun, said you are not God, there 
is only one God. And the wife of Pharaoh, saw her husband was not God. That was the 
democracy of the majority get what they want. At that time. So was Moses wrong? 
Three people – the wife of Pharaoh, Moses and Harun, against the whole of Egypt. So 
Moses was alone, but he was truthful, and righteous. The majority, democracy, they 
were many, but they were not in the right. So, Islam and democracy part ways there a 
little, because Islam is not concerned with giving the majority what they want.93 
These arguments may have helped to authorize voting – reassuring Muslim voters that 
participation was acceptable – but it is not clear that they did anything further to shape the 
decisions which individuals took.  
On the coast, at least, most voters seem to have voted in ways which were by not dictated by 
their religious beliefs. Abduba Dida polled very modestly.94 While Muslim candidates were 
returned for many positions - governors, senators, members of the national assembly, ward 
representatives and women’s representatives – the only candidate who ran on an overtly 
Muslim platform was Sheikh Muhammad Dor, who lost by some distance in the race for one of 
the Mombasa national assembly seats. In the2013 elections – as in previous ones – there was 
plentiful evidence that the reality, or promise, of patronage was a constant feature of 
campaigns. In the southern coastal constituency of LungaLunga, for example, 
KhatibMwashetani’s victory was initially overturned in the face of extensive evidence that his 
charitable foundation had given multiple donations to schools and individuals shortly before 
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the election; the Appeal Court subsequently ruled that this did not constitute improper 
influence and reinstated the result, but did not question that the donations had been made.95 
These patronage politics work at multiple levels, encouraging an engagement based on 
calculations of personal interest, as well as the interests of a community. Those seeking 
election hope for sponsorship from above, from national politicians who want the support of a 
community defined in ethnic or regional terms. Candidates themselves, in turn, seek more 
local intermediaries, whose support they try to win through gifts of money or sometimes of 
food or other items, and/or through promises of future favour. These intermediaries in turn 
use those gifts and promises to try and increase their existing status and influence in their 
community, and to encourage its members to vote for the candidate. Intermediaries operate at 
very varied levels. Some are very local indeed, representing sub-groups of sub-groups in ways 
which constantly recycle and refine the categories of race, ethnicity and locality: the members 
of a particular ethnic group in a particular part of an urban constituency; a particular clan;  up-
country hawkers in a coastal town. ‘Traditional’ elders, youth leaders, neighbourhood activists, 
the secretaries of local cultural associations, coordinators of self-help groups – all came 
forward,  offering to deliver the votes of their groups to candidates, in return for money or 
other gifts. 
Just as some prominent Muslims tried involved themselves in politics to assert their role as 
national leaders, influential figures in local Muslim society – well-known preachers, or the 
imams of mosques, or just men well-known for piety and/or scholarship – were drawn into 
electoral politics by the opportunities for such intermediacy. While the open endorsement of a 
particular candidate from the pulpit seems to have been avoided, such men could and did use 
their influence quite openly to support particular candidates – even as they used the material 
goods offered by the candidate to enhance their own standing. It was not uncommon in 
Mombasa for a mosques to be categorized as ‘Msikiti wa Joho’ – that is a mosque where the 
imam was believed to be campaigning for Hassan Joho, a candidate for the governorship; 
similarly, some clerics came to be termed mashaykh wa CORD, ‘CORD sheikhs’,  or Ma-Imam 
wa Jubilee, ‘Jubilee Imams’, because of their alleged work for one or other of the two main 
contending coalitions. But Islam was only ever a subordinate category in this layered politics: 
in the multiple levels of electoral contest, from national presidency right down to ward 
representation in local county assemblies, there was no single contest in which ‘the Muslim 
vote’ manifested itself through consensus over which candidate, or which policies, Muslims 
should support. People voted for candidates who they trusted to deliver some material reward 
– and the campaign itself saw some very open distribution of gifts to potential voters.96  While 
Sheikh Dor could, as a nominated MP in the former assembly, claim to represent Muslims 
collectively, this positioning did not help him in seeking to win a constituency seat. To be an 
MP in Kenya has its own expectations, since MPs are providers of goodies to their constituents: 
they are patrons to be called upon to assist in payment of fees, funeral expenses, or wedding 
contributions. While the referendum had offered Muslim leaders the opportunity to point to a 
common threat and use it to buttress a desire for Muslims to vote together, this did not work in 
                                                          
95 The record of the initial case, with detailed descriptions of the donations involved,  is at 
www.kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/91106 ; the appeal court decision was reported in 
‘Lungalunga by-election cancelled as Mwashetani wins appeal’, Daily Nation, 27 Nov. 2013, 
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96Willis and Chome, ‘Marginalization and political participation’. 
the patronage politics of constituency elections. In the presidential election, the coast did vote 
largely for Raila Odinga, but again there is no evidence that this was a particularly Muslim vote 
– the county of Taita-Taveta, which has a relatively small Muslim population compared to 
some other coastal counties, also showed a strong majority for Raila. 
Conclusion 
The visibility of the electoral boycott campaign on the coast makes it easy to overstate its 
influence. In cyberspace, the language of the call, and the counter-arguments of those who 
opposed a boycott, suggest a coastal – and wider Kenyan -  Islam vigorously engaged in an 
international debate over Islam and democracy. Radicals paint elections as part of an 
international conspiracy against Islam. Others – including those who aspire to represent the 
Muslim community in Kenyan national politics – may share a sense that there is an 
international contest between Islam and its enemies, yet make an argument for united Muslim 
engagement with the ballot, based on expediency rather than on the inherent virtues of 
democracy. These two perspectives can come into violent conflict: a series of incidents at 
mosques in Mombasa in November 2013 to June 2014, including the murder of a prominent 
CIPK leader, seem to have been driven by suspicions that established organizations such as the 
CIPK had become compromised by their willingness to cooperate with the state or with 
international donors.97 But alongside these sometimes violent disputes over the nature of 
Islam, the pattern of grass-roots electoral politics offers a different lesson: the less visible 
politics of local participation have turned on personal ties of patronage and affiliation, 
expressed in networks of kinship, clan, ethnicity or personal clientilism.  
Given the absence of any widely-accepted leadership for Muslims, there is little evidence that 
the arguments made for a conditional political involvement – in so far as they are heard at all –
drive participation as Muslims. The ‘Muslim vote’ remains elusive, because the rivalry of 
leaders – rooted in long-standing ideas of racial and ethnic difference – is constantly reinforced 
by the fracturing effects of Kenya’s patrimonial politics: as Ndzovu has argued ‘racial 
polarization has been the main predicament of a Muslim political movement’.98 The equivocal 
scholarly approval of elections may authorize a conditional political involvement by Muslims, 
particularly at the coast. But they generally vote not as Muslims but as people whose interests 
are shaped by kinship, ethnicity and locality. Bakari’s suggestion that Muslims are now ‘very 
well integrated into the Kenyan political system’ is perhaps more ambiguous than the author 
intended:99  such participation affirms their involvement in Kenyan politics, but does not 
necessarily signal a fundamental acceptance of the principles or practice of secular democracy. 
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